Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Why Sierra Leone Is Right to Give Anticorruption Enforcers Broad Powers

Enforcement of the criminal law, though not sufficient to combat corruption, is an important element of an effective anticorruption strategy. Too often, corruption has low risks and high returns; it is the job of anticorruption laws, and law enforcers, to reverse that, so that corruption becomes a high-risk, low-return enterprise. Over the last several years, Sierra Leone—which has historically been perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in the world—has taken this dictum seriously. The country’s aggressive anticorruption crackdown—spearheaded by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), which I lead—is already showing results. Some of the important features of Sierra Leone’s anticorruption enforcement regime are as follows:

  • Convictions for serious corruption offenses carry a minimum prison term of five years, as well as a hefty fine.
  • The ACC has the power to enter any business premises without a warrant, may conduct searches and collect evidence without a warrant, and may arrest and detain persons suspected of committing a corrupt act without a warrant. Properties alleged to be the subject matter of corruption investigation can be confiscated and kept for up to six months without a court order.
  • The ACC works with informants and undercover agents, who can sometimes be deployed to participate in illicit activity to gather evidence and build a case.
  • The ACC employs a team of specially-trained elite officers called the “Scorpion Squad,” which can conduct “militarized” raids to arrest persons engaged in brazen acts of corruption.
  • Suspects accused of economic crimes, including corruption, may be detained without bail for up to ten days.
  • Following traditional English law, Sierra Leone’s evidence law permits the use in court even of illegally-obtained evidence, so long as it is relevant. (That is, there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.)

The ACC has taken full advantage of its authority and legal powers to change Sierra Leone’s fortunes in the fight against corruption. Indeed, the aggressive enforcement strategy is. But some observers might be uncomfortable with some of the features of Sierra Leone’s anticorruption framework sketched above. Do these harsh laws, broad enforcement powers, and permissive evidentiary rules threaten human rights or due process values?

To be sure, concerns about human rights and due process are always reasonable considerations. But it would be a mistake to allow those concerns to handicap effective anticorruption enforcement strategies. This is especially so in countries, like Sierra Leone, where corruption poses such a grave threat. As the saying goes, desperate times call for desperate measures. Striking the right balance between effective anticorruption enforcement and respect for defendants’ rights is challenging, and the right balance will depend on each country’s situation. It would therefore be inappropriate to criticize a country like Sierra Leone for taking a more aggressive, and less defendant-protective, approach than might be the norm in countries where corruption is not so serious a problem.

Many countries have relied on aggressive enforcement practices to get once-pervasive corruption under control. In perhaps the best-known example, Singapore changed its fortunes—transforming itself from little more than a fishing metropolis sixty years ago into a highly developed nation—in part because of the country’s willingness to vigorously enforce strong anticorruption laws. Other countries have similarly benefited from the reward of strong anticorruption law enforcement, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Georgia, and Rwanda.

In contrast, many developing countries remain overly constrained by defendant-protective procedural rules and limits on investigative and prosecutorial power, allowing corruption to ravage the very fabric of their existence, leaving them poor and underdeveloped. These countries have been unwilling to put sufficiently strong enforcement regimes into place. For example, Kenya was once Africa’s shining star of anticorruption practices, but it is now falling behind, in part because of how relaxed its enforcement practices have become following the promulgation of its 2010 Constitution. This extremely progressive, rights-based constitution has produced a wave of litigation against Kenyan anti-graft agency, crippling it with injunctions and other right-based processes. There are, perhaps, more cases brought against Kenya’s anti-graft agency (typically on constitutional or human rights grounds) than the agency has brought against the corrupt. Kenya even permits “anticipatory bail,” whereby a potential accused person can go to a judge and secure bail before arrest. This, coupled with a highly toxic socio-political environment, continues to impede genuine efforts against corruption in one of Africa’s most promising countries. Nigeria faces a similar problem. Aggressive enforcement of elaborate defendant-protective procedural rules often allows corrupt defendants—particularly high-profile defendants—to walk free on legal technicalities.

None of this is to say that due process and human rights should be ignored. To the contrary, ensuring that a country’s anticorruption enforcement strategy does not involve extreme violations of fundamental human rights is crucial. In Sierra Leone, for example, although the law gives the ACC and other enforcement agencies wide latitude, the ACC is not above the law: Its decisions can be subjected to administrative review and judicial oversight. Nonetheless, the Constitution provided important exceptions that ensured that genuine law enforcement efforts are not subjected to Kenya-type litigious scrutiny that gives the corrupt the upper hand and judges too much room to frustrate anticorruption efforts. The balance that Sierra Leone has struck between empowering anticorruption enforcers and protecting the rights of those accused of corruption is different from the way that balance has been struck in other countries—and rightly so. Each country should do what is necessary and appropriate to hold its citizens accountable. Yes, due process and human rights are important. But in a country like Sierra Leone, lackluster actions against entrenched corruption can be more costly.

3 thoughts on “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Why Sierra Leone Is Right to Give Anticorruption Enforcers Broad Powers

  1. The truest value of anti-corruption efforts lies in the change in the mindset of the people towards best practices and impartial application of the law. I so severely doubt how much of this has been achieved in Sierra Leone today anyway. See the recent revelation about parliament, the house responsible for making law. May the Good Lord save us from bad deeds and disinformation!

  2. Thank you Francis for this really educational post! I often see articles supporting a blanket due process and human rights superiority over seemingly aggressive enforcement, and it’s great to learn about a more balanced narrative. I’m curious as to if there are relatively influential activist groups/individuals (not sporadic) pushing against these broad enforcement powers. I find it interesting that in many countries, some domestic human rights groups, especially those advocating against specific anti-corruption or anti-terrorism enforcements against certain high-profile defendants (the first country that comes to mind is Egypt: some human rights activists protested against El-Sisi govt’s prosecution of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, then they turned out to be supporters of the MB, or so the Sisi govt claimed). This looks more like a political issue than a human rights one, as some activists are not being litigious for the sake of universal human rights, but for political purposes (they want to keep corrupt leaders in power or they are simply against the incumbent govt). I’m wondering if you believe Sierra Leone will run into similar problems in the future–political oppositions hijacking human rights narratives, given the recent attempted coups–and possible political instability.

  3. Your link named “Georgia” is not related to the country of Georgia; it leads to the criminal code of the US state of Georgia

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