Last November, Javier Milei, a former economics professor and political outsider, won the presidency of Argentina, riding a wave of popular outrage against the political elite. The roots of that outrage are not hard to understand: Argentina is in the midst of a historic economic crisis, with out-of-control inflation and skyrocketing poverty. And many believe, with some justification, that Argentina’s deep-rooted political corruption is partly to blame. Argentina has been rocked by a series of corruption scandals, several of which have been documented on this blog (see here, here, and here). In campaigning on a platform of radical economic reform, Milei promised to take on the “parasites” and “thieves” who comprise the corrupt elite. After Milei’s victory, he immediately faced a problem in advancing his policy agenda: his newly-created party won just 44 out of 329 seats in Congress. That left Milei with two options: He could either take the traditional route of trying to form alliances with other parties to get some form of compromise reform package through Congress, or he could push the constitutional envelope by trying to enact aggressive reforms through executive fiat. Milei has chosen the latter path. This is not surprising: He was always going to face an uphill battle getting Congress onboard with his aggressive reforms, as there are simply too many entrenched interests, and Milei himself is an exceptionally polarizing figure. But pushing through radical reforms without congressional consent will require approval of the Supreme Court, an institution deeply embedded in the political caste.

In seeking to secure Supreme Court approval of his attempt to radically restructure the economy by executive fiat, Milei appears poised to make Argentina’s corruption problem even worse. Many observers believe that one of Argentina’s current Justices—a savvy political power player named Ricardo Lorenzetti—offered Milei a deal: If Milei would appoint Lorenzetti’s allies to fill the two vacant seats on the Court—which would give Lorenzetti’s faction a majority—Lorenzetti would use his influence to ensure favorable judicial treatment of Milei’s aggressive reforms in the justice system. One of the two nominees that Milei has put forward, a Lorenzetti ally named Ariel Lijo, is one of the Argentine judiciary’s most notoriously corrupt figures. One can see why Milei was tempted to stack the Court with Justices who would reliably side with him, but this is a Faustian bargain that poses a grave and long-term danger to anticorruption efforts in Argentina.

To put it simply, Ariel Lijo is corrupt. He lives a lavish lifestyle well beyond what he could afford on a modest judge’s salary, and he is a presumed beneficiary of the schemes of his brother, who is known to facilitate arrangements between criminal defendants and judges. Both of them have been the subject of numerous investigations, but given the leverage Lijo has built, those cases are inevitably dismissed. He is also well-known for using a practice called cajonear (literally, “to put in a drawer”): shelving but never closing cases against powerful individuals, including politicians and top officials, as a means to extract favors and gain influence. Prominent journalists, Congresspeople, and lawyers, as well as the Buenos Aires Bar Association and even the American Chamber of Commerce, have criticized the choice of Lijo for his lack of integrity and association with corruption.

Appointing such a corrupt individual to Argentina’s highest court will only worsen the already poor perception of the Argentine judiciary, complicating the credibility of future corruption investigations and encouraging the worst actors in the system.  It also sends all the wrong messages about who and what gets rewarded in the judicial system. More practically, from his perch on the Supreme Court, Lijo could thwart corruption investigations (and for a long time—at just 55 years of age, he would be on the Supreme Court for twenty years).

Additionally, because judicial nominations must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate, the very process of confirming Lijo could end up favoring impunity for former Presidents Kirchner and Macri. Both of them face ongoing corruption proceedings (see here and here), and both of them also control a significant portion of Congress as leaders of their respective parties. So far both Kirchner (Milei’s rival on the left) and Macri (Milei’s potential rival within the center-right) have remained notably silent on Lijo’s nomination, likely waiting to see what they can demand in exchange for their approval. If confirmed, Lijo would have the power to make life much better for both former Presidents. Milei can and should do better. He should retract his nomination of Lijo and work with his party, legal associations, and Congress to nominate someone with integrity. (Notably, his nominee to fill the other Supreme Court vacancy, Manuel García-Mansilla, is the Dean of a prestigious law school in Buenos Aires with a much cleaner record.) It’s understandable that an inexperienced outsider like Milei might be tempted by what seems like that quickest and simplest way to sidestep the obstacles to his ambitious policy agenda. But Milei can secure his majority on the Court without compromising the Court’s integrity this way. Milei promised radical restructuring of Argentina’s economy, but he also campaigned on an anticorruption platform—and while he can’t win the anticorruption battle right now, he can certainly lose it. With Lijo, he’s losing it.