Learning from the Collapse of CICIG, MACCIH, and CICIES: What Lessons for the Future?

Six years ago, the world was celebrating one of the most innovative and promising investigative commissions to curb grand corruption: Guatemala’s International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, or CICIG). CICIG was a domestic-international hybrid organization that exposed sixty criminal networks, charged nearly 700 people, and took down high-level officials, including Guatemala’s sitting president, vice president, and head of the public prosecutor’s office  (see here, here, here, and here). CICIG was so successful that it inspired two of Guatemala’s neighbors, El Salvador and Honduras, to create commissions on a similar model: MACCIH in Honduras (created in 2016) and CICIES in El Salvador (created in 2019). The key element setting these commissions apart from traditional anticorruption agencies was their hybrid domestic-international setup. In all three cases, the commissioners were supported by an international body (the UN for CICIG and Office of American States (OAS) for MACCIH and CICIES), and the commissions were led by foreigners. The commissions had ambitious mandates, but also limited powers: They could not prosecute on their own, but rather had to work with the national prosecutor’s office. Initially, MACCIH and CICIES scored a few remarkable victories, taking down a handful of government officials. This fueled optimism that these institutions, together with CICIG, would prove to be a powerful and sustainable anticorruption innovation.

Now, several years later, the bloom is off the rose. None of these commissions are still operating. And the story of their demise is remarkably similar: In each country, the commission’s investigations got too close to the incumbent administration, ultimately leading the president to either terminate the commission’s mandate or let it expire (see here, here, and here). This all-too-familiar story highlights a difficult challenge in fighting corruption effectively, one that is not limited to these special hybrid commissions: The main point of creating independent anticorruption bodies is to make possible the investigation and prosecution of the politically powerful—those who might benefit from de facto impunity if investigations were left to the ordinary institutions of justice—but at the same time, these independent commissions are sustainable only as long as the politically powerful would not find it more expedient to shut them down.

It’s difficult to thread this needle, and I’m reluctant to second-guess the leaders of CICIG, MACCIH, and CICIES regarding their strategic choices. Still, the fates of these commissions suggest a few valuable lessons that might be applicable to other anticorruption agencies that find themselves facing a comparable dilemma:

  • First, anticorruption commissions should choose their battles wisely, and avoid antagonizing the sitting administration or other powerful figures too soon. That is a bitter pill for many anticorruption advocates to swallow, and it may also be unwelcome advice for career prosecutors who would like to simply follow the evidence where it takes them. But in this context, the better part of valor is discretion. Realistically, one cannot expect the heads of government to expose themselves, or their family members or close associates, to a significant risk of conviction and incarceration. If they can avoid this possibility by shutting down the anticorruption commission, they will usually do so. (It’s true that CICIG was able to successfully take down then-sitting President Otto Pérez Molina and his Vice President, but this is generally not how the story goes. In fact, President Molina released a statement shortly after his arrest stating that he deeply regretted extending CICIG’s mandate and that he only did so in response to U.S. pressure.) To be clear, in urging discretion I am not suggesting that such commissions must consign themselves to irrelevance, or focus only on the pettiest forms of administrative corruption. In countries where corruption is widespread, there will be plenty of important targets, including former government officials, high-ranking (but dispensable) bureaucrats, members of the justice system (such as corrupt police chiefs, judges, and prosecutors), business elites, and others. Even if some of these figures are allied with the incumbent administration, the president and other senior politicians may be reluctant to dismantle a popular anticorruption commission to save a corrupt judge or general, even though they would shut it down to save their own skins. Refraining from targeting the most powerful actors in the system, at least initially, would allow a commission to carry out significant criminal investigations, all the while building its credibility and public support, and giving the commission time to strengthen itself politically and institutionally.
  • Second, the commission should use that time to promote reforms that will enhance their powers, expand their mandates, and strengthen their independence—reforms that will make it more feasible for the commissions to withstand the inevitable political backlash when they do start pursuing investigations that directly threaten the interests or liberty of the most powerful political figures in the country. The greater the autonomy of the commissions, the more difficult it will be for current and future administrations to pull the plug when intimidated. The commissions should also advocate for legal changes to close existing loopholes that protect corrupt officials—for example, modifying bank secrecy laws to increase transparency, and withdrawing immunity laws that shield presidents from prosecution in corruption cases. To its credit, CICIG proposed over 30 important policy reforms that can serve as examples (see here, here, and here).
  • Third, the commission should focus not just on conducting investigations, but on enhancing the capacity, integrity, and professionalism of the national law enforcement institutions with which it collaborates. CICIG actually did quite a good job on this front, helping Guatemalan law enforcement agencies effectively use advanced tools for investigating criminal networks, such as wiretapping, witness protection programs, and plea bargaining.
  • Fourth, anticorruption commissions should prioritize educating the public about the importance of curbing corruption. Commissions can pursue this educative function in a variety of ways, such as engaging directly with civil society groups, think tanks, and academia. Such engagement not only helps further the commission’s mission of raising the public salience of anticorruption, but can also help build alliances that can provide political support for the commissions when they inevitably face political hostility from the powers that be.

Now, these recommendations could and do apply to any new anticorruption agency operating in a politically challenging environment; these suggestions are not unique to hybrid agencies like CICIG, MACCIH, and CICIES. But while a few years back one might have hoped that these hybrid commissions would not need to be quite so cautious due to their international support, the fates of all three illustrates the limitations of that protection. A change in the political priorities and philosophy of a powerful international partner can lead to the sudden withdrawal of international protection for a commission, and commissions need to keep this possibility in mind.

It’s one thing to create a new anticorruption agency; it’s another thing to sustain that agency over a prolonged period. Sustainability requires a long-term strategy, one that will enable the commission to build its credibility, increase public confidence and support, and effectively advocate for legal changes. As the commission builds its capacity, autonomy, and support, it will become less dependent on international support and protection, and eventually become strong enough to take on the most powerful members of the government.

13 thoughts on “Learning from the Collapse of CICIG, MACCIH, and CICIES: What Lessons for the Future?

  1. Excellent post, Ella! You talk about a very relevant and delicate topic: the role and stability of anticorruption commissions in developing countries. Those commissions need autonomy and support to survive and perform their control activities. However, they often face problems of political nature.

    Public opinion and voters may have an important role in the preservation of anticorruption commissions. For instance, a politician may avoid extinguishing a commission because of the potential political backlash that he/she can suffer.

    So, I got curious about the post. Do you know how was the public opinion reaction when those commissions were shutdown by their governments?

  2. Interesting point on CICIG’s success in taking down an executive largely being attributed to U.S. pressure. It makes me wonder whether the long-term viability of these kinds of hybrid institutions (and how ambitious they can be in picking who to prosecute) is more closely tied to the level of active support from outside countries, rather than the domestic government.

  3. Zachary, I think the long term viability of these kinds of hybrid institutions is largely tied to active support from big brother America. I doubt that other countries’ support would muscle the kind of leverage required to make a difference. Not trying to diminish their roles but U.S pressure has always counted. For the third world countries particularly, it plays a critical role because the public is often unable to hold leaders to account. The public is also often held in a form of capture by the political elite. Plus, there is always some form of information assymetry that keesp them ignorant of the corruption going on. Leaders in such countries spend massive resources on disinformation, propaganda and corruption cover-ups.

  4. Rafael, talking about public opinion and voters ensuring anticorruption commissions thrive, did you think of situations where public opinion is suppressed and voters have no voice due to electoral rigging? I think in such countries, the public opinion and voters would not be able to save the anticorruption institutions.

  5. Thanks, Ella, for your great suggestions. I’m sympathetic to the suggestion that anti-corruption commissions should take heed of political realities and choose their battles wisely but wonder how these commissions can square these prudential concerns with the pursuit of corruption. Your other suggestions, which focus on improving anti-corruption culture and infrastructure, seem like terrific ideas. I do wonder, however, how we ensure that anti-corruption commissions don’t become toothless. I realize that this is especially difficult given what’s already happened with the collapse of CICIG, MACCIH, and CICIES, but it’d be great for your thoughts on how to navigate this challenging issue.

    • Thank you Justin for your comments. I understand your concern, however, countries with systemic corruption such as those discussed in this post, will have a multitude of other important targets to focus on (police chiefs, judges, former government officials, etc.). Avoiding the members of the incumbent administration should not hinder anticorruption efforts in this regard as you are still prosecuting high-ranking corrupt officials.

  6. Really excellent and interesting posting, Ella! I’m particularly convinced on the fourth idea—that anticorruption commissioners should be prioritizing public education. I think that public education is not only a good end in itself, but actually feeds into your first suggestion. To me, if the public is educated on the importance of curbing corruption, then that feeds into politicians reluctant to dismantling a popular anti corruption commission that the public has been adequately educated on. Did CICIG, MACCIH, or CICIES engage in any public education campaigns?

  7. Excellent post, Ella. Similar to Justin, I’m sympathetic to the suggestion that commissions of this sort should choose their battles wisely, especially early on. Looking more long term, however, I wonder how long these commissions need to “tip toe” and strengthen themselves politically and institutionally. From your knowledge on these commissions, do you have a time frame that you think would be necessary for more low-level investigations before a commission perhaps targets someone more high-level?

  8. Ella, you raised really interesting points about these hybrid institutions. Following up Zac’s question, I am wondering if they were supposed to last long. I think your third suggestion is really great: maybe the role of these institutions is building on anticorruption independent mechanisms in these countries. Do you have any thoughts about the viability of these institutions in the long-term and the merits of establishing them for a short period of time?

  9. Ella (and other readers), is there a literature at this point on such hybrid institutions? I’m thinking not only of these Central American bodies, but the mixed international/local prosecutorial and judicial bodies in BiH and Kosovo, and oversight bodies such as the MEC for Afghanistan and some similar exercises, I think, for Ukraine.

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