It’s getting harder to prosecute federal corruption crimes in the United States. In a recent case called Snyder v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the scope of a key anti-bribery law. And this decision is only the latest in a series of cases over the past decade that have limited the reach of federal prosecutors in going after state and local public corruption. While Congress could always enact legislation to expand the scope of federal anticorruption laws, significant legislative action seems unlikely anytime soon.

Given the increasing difficulty of corruption prosecution at the federal level, could state prosecutors step in to pursue cases now beyond the reach of federal law enforcement? After all, federal and state prosecutors share partly overlapping responsibilities for anticorruption enforcement in the United States. Although the Supreme Court has increasingly rejected broad theories of federal criminal liability especially in the context of state and local corruption, the Supreme Court’s narrow readings of federal anticorruption laws pose no barrier to cases brought by state prosecutors enforcing state law (see, for example, here and here). To be sure, federal prosecutors have traditionally played a substantial role in rooting out state and local government corruption, and many remain skeptical that state prosecutors can take up the anticorruption role that federal prosecutors have long played. Yet while state prosecutions might not be a perfect substitute for robust federal anticorruption enforcement, there are compelling reasons to think that state prosecutors could meaningfully fill the gap that the Supreme Court has opened up in the U.S. anticorruption system.

One reason that many are skeptical that state prosecutors can pick up the slack on anticorruption enforcement focuses on practical considerations. State prosecutors have heavy caseloads compared to federal prosecutors. State prosecutors also face pressure to prioritize violent crimes, which may have higher public salience and urgency compared to white-collar crimes like public corruption. Corruption cases also often involve complex investigations that span months or years and employ specialized tools like undercover agents and wiretaps. Federal prosecutors may have more resources and expertise to handle these complex cases compared to state prosecutors.

Those concerns, however, are not as powerful as they might seem at first. Public corruption, while nonviolent, is highly salient, and successful prosecutions can have a powerful impact on the public consciousness. With respect to the resource constraint problem, states can and should dedicate more resources to corruption prosecution to relieve the burden on caseloads, and state prosecutors. While corruption cases can be complex, state prosecutors’ offices could prioritize hiring and training prosecutors capable of conducting expertise in complex white-collar prosecutions. Moreover, the expertise gap with federal prosecutors will narrow as state prosecutors regularly handle more corruption cases. And this expertise gap may be overstated to begin with: State prosecutors have successfully performed white-collar criminal investigations when they have the political will to do so.

That reference to political will, though, highlights the other, and perhaps more significant perceived obstacle to state and local prosecution of corruption. Many argue that state prosecutors, who are often themselves elected officials, are too close to potential investigative targets and are reluctant to pursue cases against political allies or powerful state officials. State prosecutors are also vulnerable to political backlash and retaliation.

 But this concern, while by no means trivial, may also be exaggerated. Federal enforcement is not the only way to create separation between the prosecutors and the targets of investigations. Other mechanisms include having other jurisdictions investigate in county-level cases, appointing special prosecutors or commissions, or creating walled-off anticorruption units with statewide prosecution authority. All these approaches have individual benefits and drawbacks, but they are plausible alternatives to federal prosecution of state and local corruption. Additionally, state prosecutors can work together with federal prosecutors to pursue investigations and prosecutions jointly. In Ohio, after federal law enforcement arrested and prosecuted the state House Speaker and his associates based on a bribery scheme involving state public utilities, state prosecutors followed up with their own investigations and prosecutions, under state law, of individuals involved in that bribery scheme. This model can pool investigative resources and expertise while avoiding the jurisdictional barriers that could otherwise impede federal enforcement.

While state prosecutions of corruption cases face real barriers, those barriers are far from insurmountable. Given the slow erosion of federal anticorruption law over the past decade, state prosecutors may be the last line of defense in upholding the integrity of public institutions. State governments should invest now in the resources, expertise, and political will necessary to allow state prosecutors to vigorously enforce anticorruption law where federal prosecutors cannot act.