How do states escape pervasive corruption? Expanding the small set of success stories, a burgeoning line of research (see here, here, here, here, or here) seeks answers to this question through the study of polities that have achieved control of corruption before Second World War. This group of so-called “early achievers” mostly consist of Western and Northern European countries as well as territories that seceded from them. One lesson that has been drawn from the study of early achievers is that the gradual depoliticization of governance is an essential step on a society’s path to becoming free from endemic corruption. Indeed, some have suggested that transitioning to a robust democracy before building a sufficiently effective and clean state is a recipe for corruption and state capture, as political parties will organize on clientalist lines and focus mainly on capturing rents. The key to combating systemic corruption, on this account, is building a strong and professional class of civil servants and judges who are insulated from politics.

The case of Switzerland, which has received little attention so far, presents a puzzle in this regard. Now a textbook example of effective (domestic) corruption control, early nineteenth century Switzerland shared many of the klepocratic governance patterns we find in low- and middle-income countries today. Long dominated by a handful of wealthy families, from the 1830s onwards Swiss state institutions fell under the sway of a group of entrepreneurs involved in the financing and organization of railway construction. These “Railway Barons” dominated Swiss politics through a web of patronage networks and used the captured institutions of the state to assert their individual interests. But by the beginning of the twentieth century, Switzerland was free from such systemic corruption. Remarkably, and contrary to conventional thinking about early achievers, Switzerland accomplished this not by limiting democracy, but by doubling down on it.

Upon its founding in 1848, the modern Swiss Confederation (a federal state made up of 26 member states, known as the Cantons) adopted a system of representative democracy, in which first-past-the-post voting and gerrymandering originally guaranteed the Railway Barons many key offices. In contrast, a professional class of bureaucrats and judges was slow to emerge. In the Cantons, a Weberian-style bureaucracy, with hierarchical departments headed by government members, did not appear until the 1860s. The federal administration was built from scratch. There were also few rules on recusal or conflict of interest for civil servants. Most public officials were not appointed by the state but elected to office for specific terms. The courts were often staffed by laymen who decided legal disputes according to equitable considerations. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that trained jurists had taken over the highest courts in the Cantons, and lay judges continued to preside over first-instance courts until very recently. Swiss judges were elected by parliaments or by popular vote and were members of political parties (most still are). In light of all this, Switzerland’s remarkable success in curbing systemic corruption in the second half of the nineteenth century cannot be attributed to a susitained track record of building a strong, politically insulated Weberian bureaucracy and an independent judicial system.

Rather, the key changes were driven by a campaign for more direct democracy. From the 1860s onwards, a “Democracy Movement”—a coalition of political groups in the Cantons seeking social change—challenged the Railway Barons’ dominance. The Democracy Movement took advantage of a provision of the 1848 Federal Constitution that required the Cantons to submit their respective constitutions to a popular vote, and to allow an absolute majority of citizens to demand a complete revision. This minimum standard, which was actively enforced by the Federal Assembly, served as a gateway for the movement to remove regional governments. In turn, the Democracy Movement introduced a number of direct democratic reforms in the Cantons and, eventually, in the Confederation. Of these reforms, the two most important were (1) the right to veto legislation through a popular referendum, and (2) the right to initiate popular referendums on specific constitutional revisions. Given they could be triggered any time, these tools increased political accountability in between elections (without the disadvantages of short election cycles). Additionally, they enabled voters to express their views on specific issues, rather than merely selecting among candidates for public office. Though initially limited in scope and effect, these two instruments gradually diffused across the Cantons and evolved into powerful tools of democratic accountability. The Confederation introduced the popular veto in 1874 and the right to initiate popular votes on partial constitutional revisions in 1891. Some Cantons also developed related democratic instruments, such as the popular rights to initiate legislation or to veto budgetary proposals. 

The rights to veto legislation and to initiate referendums on constitutional amendments mitigated the shortcomings of Swiss representative democracy and strengthened its anticorruption capacity. Direct democracy became a tool to curb state capture. For example, an 1868 constitutional amendment in Canton Thurgau declared highest state offices incompatible with “paid employment in a joint-stock company.” The provision directly targeted the Barons and their clients, who often served in high elected office while continuing to control or work for big corporations. Direct democracy also furthered public integrity in subtler ways. The fact that government decisions could be overridden by a popular veto gave Swiss politicians stronger incentives to seek consensus, and undermined the power cartel around the Barons. Veto players gradually moved into the federal cabinet, which had previously been dominated by one-party rule, and policymakers began consulting broader constituencies in the legislative process to prevent vetoes. The final blow to hegemonic politics came in form of a 1918 popular initiative that introduced proportional elections for the House of Representatives.

To be sure, direct democracy was no silver bullet against corruption. The original hegemonic governance practices of the Barons were superseded by a politics of power-sharing, with elite cohesion remaining exceptionally high until the 1990s. Swiss politics still has many clientelist features: political parties divide public office among each other, politicians and interest groups have close ties, and local nepotism persist. The shortcomings of the Swiss financial sector are familiar to everyone. Yet, since the fall of the Railway Barons, corruption has never again become pervasive in Switzerland.

The Swiss case shows that there is no single path from systemic corruption to clean governance, and may hold broader lessons for modern anticorruption reformers as well. In key respects, Switzerland in the mid-nineteenth century was in a similar position as many countries plagued by endemic corruption today. Switzerland had made a relatively recent transition to representative democracy, but it had a relatively low income standard (especially when compared to its European neighbors), and faced high social and political polarization after a brief civil war in 1847. The fact that Switzerland was able to strike a decisive blow against corruption through the use and expansion of direct democratic institutions at least hints at the possibility that such tools may be more viable in the modern world than many analysts have assumed so far.

Of course, modern reformers need to be mindful of several other important aspects of the Swiss case. Nineteenth century Switzerland benefitted from a popular embrace of liberal-democratic values, high levels of education, and rising prosperity. It had only 2-3 million inhabitants at the time, so may have faced different corruption challenges from large states. National unity among these inhabitants may have also been promoted by constant threat from outside powers. Finally, direct democracy has deeper historical roots in Switzerland than in many other places. For these and other reasons, it would be a mistake to conclude that there is a “Swiss model” that modern countries can straightforwardly follow. Nevertheless, the Swiss story complicates the view that the depoliticization of governance, rather than democratic reform, is key to achieving anticorruption success. The Swiss case, when juxtaposed with the evidence from other early achievers, suggests that we should think carefully about the form and conditions in which democratic institutions can become part of the solution rather than the problem.