It is now two decades plus since the fight against corruption emerged as a major issue. One that has been a particular challenge in nations still struggling to overcome the legacy of communism. Today’s Guest Post tracks recent progress Armenia, where voters in 2018 traded a deeply corrupt, semi authoritarian government for one promising both less corruption and more democracy. Its authors: Jeffrey Hallock, a PhD candidate at American University researching anti-corruption reform strategies, and a researcher at the Accountability Research Center utilizing open government data to analyze U.S. foreign funding trends, and Karine Ghahramanyan, a senior at the American University of Armenia pursuing a degree in Politics and Governance.

Armenia, a landlocked country of 2.8 million, sits in the middle of a region defined by political uncertainty. Six years after Nikol Pashinyan spearheaded Armenia’s Velvet Revolution with a promise to eradicate systemic corruption, many regard Prime Minister Pashinyan’s efforts as stalling. Although corruption has noticeably decreased since 2018 (here), the government’s initial emphasis on anti-corruption measures has been overtaken by urgent security considerations, its 2020 defeat by neighbor and long-time adversary Azerbaijan followed by unsettling developments in neighbors Georgia, Turkey, and Iran.

Armenia’s burgeoning democracy and recent reforms have helped strengthen its position amid broader volatility, contributing to economic growth and deepening relations with democratic allies. Yet the government is under mounting pressure to recommit to the principles of transparency and accountability that gave legitimacy to the 2018 revolution.

The Pashinyan administration offers lessons on how to capitalize on a window of opportunity to advance consequential anti-corruption gains, as well as insights on when the spark of the revolution fades into the reality of quotidian government reform.

After the December 2018 parliamentary elections, Pashinyan’s government had a broad public mandate to address past corruption. While the government has launched investigations and brought charges for past crimes, the broader anti-corruption strategy was predicated on building new institutions through deliberative processes. In the immediate aftermath of what Armenians’ term the Velvet Revolution period, Armenia’s anti-corruption efforts produced notable results.

Armenia codified a “separated” anti-corruption infrastructure, expanding on prior institutions where necessary, with clearly defined mandates for the newly created and reformed agencies and departments. Armenia’s anti-corruption institutional framework now includes:

• Anticorruption Policy Council (est. June 2019) headed by the Prime Minister and composed of members from state ministries and rotating representatives from civil society deliberates draft policy and legal acts designed to fight corruption.
• Corruption Prevention Commission (November 2019) manages and oversees asset declarations, conducts integrity checks for public officials, oversees an integrity system predicated on codes of conduct and conflict of interest analysis, and handles party financing oversight, among other responsibilities.
• Department of Anticorruption Policy Development and Monitoring (July 2020) in the Ministry of Justice develops the country’s anticorruption strategies, supports institutional coordination, monitors progress on anti-corruption action plans, and oversees international anti-corruption commitment compliance.
• Anticorruption Committee (October 2021) serves an investigative role and is staffed with investigators and operational intelligence officers afforded special powers to examine suspected corruption cases.
• Department for the Control over the Legality of Pre-Trial Proceedings in the Anti-Corruption Committee (November 2021) in the Prosecutor’s Office retains jurisdiction over the prosecution of suspected corruption cases brought by other bodies..
• Anticorruption Court (July 2022) handles cases that fit under the country’s legal definition of corruption. The Anticorruption Court of Appeals (June 2023) and the Anticorruption Chamber in the Court of Cassation (July 2019) handle appeals then final decisions on corruption cases.

Armenia’s civil society has played a critical consultative and oversight role in anti-corruption reform efforts, gradually strengthening from when Armenia first broke from Soviet control to voicing diverse perspectives during the Velvet Revolution. Today, the government holds deliberations on key topics, such as public review of the country’s proposed anti-corruption strategy. Interviews with civil society and the government confirm that civil society organizations have contributed to adopted legislation and provide topic expertise to the government.

Some groups maintain their watchdog role, publicly flagging shortcomings in the government’s actions. Notably, civil society backlash to a punitive censorship law prompted the government to backtrack on the legislation—indicating a willingness to respond to coordinated pressure. While some critics cast aspersions on civil society independence due to prominent civic figures joining the government, research shows that there was less of a civil society ‘brain drain’ than in similar cases. Armenia’s robust civil society is said to have maintained “a healthy distance from the political elite,” enabling it to continue applying pressure from below.

Armenia has shown a commitment to providing open government data across agencies, making critical information more accessible to the public. While the government acknowledges there are still shortcomings in certain areas—such as the integration of data across ministries and the continued absence of a gift registry—many databases are functional and have been used in independent investigations. With strong political backing for Open Government Partnership commitments by the Prime Minister’s Office (here), four efforts stand out:

• First, the Corruption Prevention Commission provides machine-readable asset declarations for public officials and their immediate relatives.
• Second, the Ministry of Justice established a publicly available beneficial ownership registry.
• Third, the Prosecutor’s Office provides annual reports with clear metrics on prosecutions of corruption cases, detailing the number of crimes detected in different government ministries and localities. They also publish the value of assets returned through the Department for the Confiscation of Property of Illicit Origin (est. 2020).
• Fourth, the courts provide a searchable digital platform with information on court cases (though data concerns persist); the anticorruption courts provide a dedicated publications page with judgments and other pertinent data. These two platforms represent important first steps, but the government acknowledges the need to improve e-justice services.

Despite these efforts, the public increasingly perceives the “fight against corruption” as not only stalling but regressing (here). One commonly expressed concern is that the absence of a viable political opposition removes an important check on the government (which holds a clear majority in Parliament). This gap results in a small group of investigative journalists and some NGOs standing out as the visible actors holding power to account, which some in government have used to cast them, unjustly, in an adversarial role (here). Many public concerns are grounded in legitimate questions about a lack of government transparency, the capacity to govern effectively, and commitment to the equal application of justice.    

A common critique is that the government is failing to communicate with the public in a clear and consistent manner about its anti-corruption efforts. Few citizens know about the country’s anti-corruption institutions (here), despite expressing extremely high support for the types of functions they carry out. As noted previously, effective communication is a problem that extends beyond the domestic reform space to include matters of foreign policy, as well as how public money is spent.

This lack of transparency is evident in the hiring of prosecutors who failed integrity checks without public justification, and in non-compliant registration practices concerning public information during high-profile anti-corruption cases. Government officials consistently note shortcomings in strategic public communication, but more concerning is the lack of proactive transparency about decision-making on matters of public interest.

Armenia’s government faces personnel and capacity limitations, which have led to staffing problems across anti-corruption institutions. The Corruption Prevention Commission’s demanding workload and relatively low salaries—compared to other anti-corruption bodies—have led to retention issues. Requests to the Prime Minister’s Office for staff capacitation have not yet been answered. In the Anti-Corruption Committee, the government has cited rigorous testing and integrity check standards for a lengthy hiring process and slow recruitment uptake.

Establishment of the specialized anti-corruption courts represents an important milestone for judicial reform, but the courts have encountered problems concerning both sitting and newly appointed judges. After abandoning a more comprehensive process of “extraordinary vetting” for sitting judges (here), Armenia is relying on the Corruption Prevention Commission to conduct integrity checks. However, these checks have no official sanction mechanism, and analysis of judges ultimately appointed to the anti-corruption courts indicates several candidates were tagged as “positive with reservation.” As judicial oversight and vetting present challenges across the region, trust of Armenian judges and courts remains low.

Concerns about nepotism and selective justice often emerge in conversations, with a common refrain alluding to the government being more likely to prosecute individuals associated with the prior administration than those with ties to Pashinyan’s party. While a relevant topic to monitor, Pashinyan-appointed officials have been arrested for corruption crimes, notably the former Deputy Health Minister and former Defense Minister. Critics maintain these actions amount to “sacrifices” for Pashinyan to maintain an image of impartial justice. These intimations heighten the need for the government to provide clear justifications for decisions to not advance corruption investigations that are deemed to have high public relevance.

Armenia’s well-developed anti-corruption infrastructure demonstrates how a comprehensive vision for reform buoyed by robust civic participation can produce consequential gains against systemic corruption. Yet the case also shows a contrast between reform implementation during a window of opportunity and sustaining commitments years after the initial momentum abates. Armenia’s strong civil society and committed investigative journalists continue to apply pressure from below, but the government must also take proactive steps to enhance transparency and accountability.

Part of this shift entails moving beyond reductive framings pitting the “old guard” against the new. There are reform champions across Armenian society, and the government can lead through clear public communication, proper backing for dedicated staff, and space for its anti-corruption institutions to function as designed. Regional tensions are sure to persist, but Armenia has an opportunity to cement its democratic trajectory through a recommitment to the anti-corruption reforms at the foundation of the revolution.