UNODC
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Statistical framework to measure corruption

Prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Abstract

This document provides the first draft of a comprehensive statistical framework to measure corruption for its global written consultation. The document describes UNODC's mandate on corruption and the mandate to develop global standards to measure different types of crime, the objective of this statistical framework and its development process. It also explains the challenges to measure corruption and a proposed conceptual framework of the different manifestations of corruption while providing an explanation of direct and indirect measures, including risk, regulatory response, and implementation indicators.

I. Objective of the document

1. Following the Hybrid Global Consultation hosted by UNODC on 8 and 9 December 2022 in which experts exchanged their national experiences on corruption measurement and discussed on the possible dimensions to measure corruption, UNODC is launching a Written Global Consultation to review the proposal of a Statistical Framework to measure corruption. UNODC would particularly welcome written feedback provided by experts from anti-corruption authorities, national statistical offices, criminal justice authorities, ministries, think tanks, academia, and civil society organizations.

2. Member States and experts are welcome to provide feedback in written form by sending an email to unodc-corruption.framework@un.org (email subject line: Written global consultation on corruption framework) by 17th February 2023 at the latest. Based on the feedback received from this written global consultation, UNODC will develop a second draft of the framework which will be submitted to the UN Statistical Commission for its consideration. Only inputs received by the deadline will be considered in the development of the second draft.

II. Background: past development of global statistical standards on corruption, mandates, and consultation process

3. In 2022, at the fifty-third session of the Statistical Commission, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported (E/CN.3/2022/14) together with the National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico (INEGI) on the progress made globally to implement the road map to improve the quality and availability of crime and criminal justice statistics (E/CN.3/2013/11). The 2013 road map prioritized activities structured around three main pillars:
    (a) Development of new methodological tools
    (b) Promotion of capacity building activities
    (c) Strengthening of international data collection and analysis

4. The 2013 roadmap acknowledged corruption among those emerging and difficult-to-measure crimes that demanded additional methodological development since its measurement presented major weaknesses been often based on indirect or perception-based methodology without a

consolidated approach to produce reliable and standardised measurements, and the lack of commonly agreed statistical concepts, methods, tools, and indicators.

5. In 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted the global indicator framework to measure progress on the SDGs that included two indicators [1] to measure progress on target 16.5 *Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms*. In order to support countries to regularly produce these two SDG indicators, UNODC and UNDP produced the *Manual on Corruption Surveys: Methodological Guidelines on the Measurement of Bribery and Other Forms of Corruption through Sample Surveys*. This Manual was welcomed by the Statistical Commission in 2019 at its fiftieth session. The Manual provides technical guidance to measure types of corruption that can be measured through population or business surveys including bribery (and therefore SDG indicators 16.5.1 and 16.5.2), as well as other forms of corruption such as nepotism and vote buying.

6. The importance of corruption measurement is embedded in Article 61 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) that calls on Member States to "consider analysing, in consultation with experts, trends in corruption in their territory, as well as the circumstances in which corruption offences are committed"; and "developing and sharing with each other and through international and regional organizations statistics, analytical expertise concerning corruption and information with a view to developing, insofar as possible, common definitions, standards and methodologies, as well as information on best practices to prevent and combat corruption". The Convention also states that "each State Party shall consider monitoring its policies and actual measures to combat corruption and making assessments of their effectiveness and efficiency."

7. At its 8th session, in 2019, the Conference of the States Parties (CoSP) to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), adopted the Resolution 8/10 requesting UNODC "to continue expert-level consultations on identifying and refining methodologies on the issue of the measurement of corruption in order to develop proposals on a comprehensive, scientifically sound and objective framework for the purpose of assisting States Parties, upon their request, in measuring corruption, consistent with the Convention".

8. The Special Session of the General Assembly against corruption (UNGASS), in 2021, adopted the political declaration "Our common commitment to effectively addressing challenges and implementing measures to prevent and combat corruption and strengthen international cooperation". It encouraged UNODC, in coordination with the UN Statistical Commission and in broad cooperation across the United Nations system, to develop and share a comprehensive, scientifically sound and objective statistical framework, grounded in methodological work and reliable data sources, to support States in their efforts to measure corruption, its impact and all relevant aspects of preventing and combating it, in order to inform and strengthen evidence-based

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[1] Indicator 16.5.1 *Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months* and indicator 16.5.2 *Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months*. See Global SDG Indicator Framework adopted by the General Assembly in A/RES/71/313 available at: SDG Indicators — SDG Indicators (un.org)

anti-corruption policies and strategies, consistent with the Convention against corruption.

9. UNODC has undertaken a series of activities to implement the UNGASS political declaration and the CoSP resolution on corruption measurement with support from the UNODC-INEGI Center of Excellence for Statistical Information on Government, Crime, Victimization and Justice:
   a. Between December 2021 – August 2022, UNODC compiled methodologies and frequently used indicators to measure corruption at international, regional, and national levels conducted by government and non-governmental institutions.
   b. In October 2022, UNODC conducted an internal consultation with experts from academia and international organizations to review existing research findings and international practices on corruption measurement assessing validity, relevance, and feasibility.
   c. In December 2022, UNODC organized a global hybrid consultation (in person and on-line) with eighty-eight national experts appointed by Member States from thirty-nine countries to review existing practices on measuring corruption at the national level. The international consultation involved international experts and national experts from National Statistical Offices, anti-corruption agencies, relevant ministries, and law enforcement agencies.
   d. Based on the activities listed above, UNODC has developed the first draft of the Statistical Framework to measure corruption that is part of this document to seek written feedback from a wide range of experts at the global level.
   e. A second draft of the framework will be drafted by UNODC considering feedback received from the global written consultation. A new draft will be submitted to the fifty-fourth session of the Statistical Commission to be held in 2023.
   f. After the review by the UN Statistical Commission, UNODC will have another consultation with national experts appointed by Member States before submitting the final Statistical Framework to the CoSP of the UN Convention Against Corruption for its review and adoption during its tenth session in late 2023.

III.   Objective of the Statistical Framework to measure corruption

10. The main objective of the comprehensive statistical framework to measure corruption is to provide guidance to national governments to develop national information systems able to detect the presence, measure the magnitude and monitor trends of the different forms of corruption, as per the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The framework provides a list of indicators together with guidance on how to analyze the indicators together and on how to collect the needed data. The ultimate goal of the statistical framework is to contribute to the efforts of Member States to build the sort of scientific evidence that can underpins the design, implementation, monitoring, and assessment of anti-corruption policies.

11. The Statistical Framework is meant to be used at national level to support countries to develop national statistical systems to measure corruption. Indicators that cut across the different dimensions of corruption can provide comprehensive evidence to address corruption. The

framework is comprehensive and includes different types of indicators (direct and indirect indicators).

IV. Challenges to measure corruption

12. Corruption is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to define as it takes many forms and affects all sectors of society. The first challenge to measure it is to clearly define what should be understood by the word corruption, as well as to clearly define conceptual and analytical blocks that can be useful to capture its dimension and impacts across society.

13. Considering the nature of corruption, a single definition of corruption is inadequate to measure it in a comprehensive way. The UN Convention against Corruption defines a set of behaviors that should be criminalized as corruption and a set of measures to prevent it. These definitions were commonly agreed by member states and provide a solid base for guiding methodological work and for developing standardized indicators that can measure behaviors that are acknowledged worldwide as constituting or be related to corruption by public and private actors.

14. An additional challenge in measuring corruption is that detecting corrupted behaviors is more difficult than detecting other types of crimes as victims and institutions are not always willing or able to report and register its occurrence. The dark figure of corruption- the part of corruption that doesn't come to the attention of authorities and is not recorded – is arguably higher than other forms of crime because of the fear of retaliation and co-responsibility or direct benefit from corrupt endeavors. Those who experience, witness, or identify the different types of corruption are less likely to report it to competent authorities than other crimes.

15. International organisations have made attempts to measure corruption by producing information based on perception-based indicators. Indices such as the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator or the yearly Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index identify perceptions and drivers of corruption and raise awareness of the negative effects that corruption has on sustainable development but have important limitations as these do not provide sound information on the direct occurrence of corruption and on the different types of corruption, the sectors, procedures, and formalities that are more vulnerable to corruption.

16. Despite the widely recognized limitations of perception-based measures, national systems to monitor corruption are often based on perception surveys, particularly among general population but the majority still lack output measurements that describe the direct experience of corruption among citizens, clients of public services, public officials and professional within the private sector.

V. Conceptual framework to measure of corruption for measurement purposes

17. The approach taken in the development of the measurement framework has been to encapsulate the complexity of corruption with the intersection of the different dimensions of corruption with its different operational elements. The Framework is constructed through a matrix with two dimensions: types of corruption (based on UNCAC) and type of measurement: perception, output/direct measures (experience of corruption), indirect measures (risk and response). The

framework matrix describes the two dimensions with corruption types in rows and measurement types in column.

18. Direct/Output measures that describe the whole size and direct experience of corruption are the best to measure levels of corruption and monitor trends because they capture the dark figure of corruption. Alone these measures could serve as the core of corruption measurement, but they are not available for all types of corruption, and they require substantial resources to be embedded in national statistical and anti-corruption systems. While perception is not an ideal measure, it is included in the framework to indirectly measure corruption and as a form of transitional indicators that countries may use until direct measures are fully operational.

19. The types of corruption considered in the framework are based on the UN Convention against Corruption, and include the following concepts:
    a) Corruption areas criminalized in UNCAC
        a.1 Bribery of national public officials
        a.2 Trading in influence
        a.3 Illicit enrichment
        a.4 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or other diversion of property by a public official
        a.5 Abuse of functions
        a.6 Obstruction of justice
    b) Preventive measures
        b.1 Merit-based public hiring
        b.2 Independence and integrity of the judiciary
        b.3 Conflict of interest
        b.4 Management of public finances
        b.5 Public procurement
        b.6 Access to public information
        b.7 Candidature for and election to public office
        b.8 Preventive measures for the private sector
    c) Enabling environment to report and address corruption
        c.1 International cooperation
        c.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption
        c.3 Transparency

VI.   A statistical framework to measure the different elements and dimensions of corruption

20. The statistical framework recognizes the multi-faceted complexity of corruption by incorporating a multiplicity of sources that can include, inter alia, administrative records related to public finances and other procedures within public administration (such as public procurement records, assets declaration records, audit records, access to information records, etc.), household and business sample surveys on corruption, other sample surveys, including surveys of public services, expert-based interviews, individual anonymized records on corruption offences, anonymized court casefiles and whistle-blowing files, and administrative records derived from the criminal justice system and civil procedures at all stages of their corresponding processes.

21. The adoption of the framework requires a cross-sectoral and inter-institutional approach. Given the varied array of indicators and data sources included in the framework, its implementation requires the effective collaboration of multiple relevant stakeholders, who might already have the necessary data to build the proposed indicators, and that might just need some adjustments and methodological guidance to produce standardized and reliable statistics. Another relevant aspect of the framework is that it recognizes the necessity to incorporate the gender perspective into corruption measurement. Where possible, the framework promotes a nuanced analysis of the gender perspective that goes beyond the sex-disaggregation of the data.

22. The statistical framework to measure corruption is presented in a matrix format to list indicators that relates to different forms of corruption as listed in part V and direct or indirect measures.

23. *Direct measures* are about the prevalence of specific types of corruption, particularly bribery. These indicators can typically be produced through population and business surveys, and they are robust, accurate and representative if statistical designs of the surveys are representative of the whole population. The challenge in the implementation of these surveys is that they are usually expensive and not always easy and sustainable to conduct overtime. Measure corruption directly is often not possible due to the context and the nature of the sector. For example, if a sector is by its nature hidden from the public (like financial transactions, defense or areas involving privacy) direct measurement through a survey, would not help to reveal the whole size of corruption because the public would have no direct experience to report.

24. *Indirect measures:* Due to the elusive nature of corruption and the challenge to collect data to measure it directly, indirect measures are included in the framework to provide sort of proxies that while not measuring corruption per se, they can measure elements that may enable or deter corruption. The following indirect measures are considered:

    • *Perception indicators.* The measurement of the perception of corruption may include a broader range of attitudes and beliefs (for example, conflict of interest, abuse of power, embezzlement of public funds, etc.). Perception indicators maybe be influenced by a broad range of subjective factors that may not be directly linked to the incidence of corruption such as culture, mass communication, and values. Therefore, perception-based measures are not suitable to monitor corruption levels and trends. Measuring perception of corruption together with indicators on direct experience of corruption can provide a better understanding of the gap between the perception and the corruption experienced by the surveyed targeted populations as well as its levels of trust in government institutions.

    • *Risk indicators.* These measures provide information on possible existing or not existing infrastructures and procedures that increase or decrease the risk of corruption to occur rather than the occurrence of corruption itself. They are useful to map the different types of corruption and to understand the context in which these occur. The dimension of risk depends on the capability of a society to constrain people entrusted with public office not to abuse it in their own interest- the control of corruption. Where this capability is low, corruption risk is high. Risk indicators measure the context that can enable corruption. Measuring

opportunities or risks (circumstances that enable corruption) and constrains (circumstances that deter corruption) are also important for policy makers to identify risks as well as best practices for addressing them. A society with moderate to low constraints may still manage to control corruption if opportunities remain low. The opportunities the most discussed in literature are administrative discretion resulting from lack of transparency and red tape, on one hand, and the material opportunities, like natural resources, lack of fiscal transparency, inflows of cash as aid, on another.

- *Response indicators.* As risk varies across societies (for instance, some countries have concentrated resources, which provide higher incentives for corruption, and others don't), so does the State response. The response indicators are also indirect measures because they don't measure the occurrence of corruption, but how the State responds to it through legislative initiatives (classified in the framework as *de jure*), and criminal justice actions or other actions that to go after corruption perpetrators (classified in the framework as *de facto* response).Trends in response indicators measure a mix of trends in the capacity and political will to combat corruption and corruption itself, so they are clearly indirect rather than direct measures of corruption.   The *de jure* category can be further quantified using a benchmark (comprehensives of conflict-of-interest regulation, for instance) and the measurement of each country against it. The *de jure* and the *de facto* are separated because the evidence shows that important implementation gaps exist, and the countries with the most comprehensive regulation and not necessarily the least corrupt or improving the most.

25. Each indicator included in the framework is not to be used in isolation. The matrix format aims at describing each type of corruption in a combination of indicators as alone each indicator may give a partial if not a biased information. For example, high level of convictions for corruption may mean high levels of corruption or high level of state response to corruption. Considering this indicator in combination with indicators on the level of bribery experience by citizens gives a complete picture: high bribe levels with low conviction rates suggest a high level of corruption with a low state response while low level of bribery with high level of convictions indicates a low incidence of corruption with a high level of state response. The matrix can be used by columns, by row or a combination of both.

- *Columns as analytical categories*. Reading the matrix by column captures the analytic building blocks that describe corruption, the factors that enable it and the capacity to deter it. They provide the space to integrate different types of measurement (direct, indirect), while also monitoring the relevant risks based on enabling and disabling circumstances for corruption, i.e., the opportunities and constraints, as well as the official legal and law enforcement response. The columns related to Risks and Response describe some specific elements of the preventive anti-corruption policies and practices mentioned in Article 5 of UNCAC.

- *Rows as analytical categories.* In the matrix use the various features of corruption that UNCAC lists, thus allowing different forms of corruption to be accommodated complementarily into the same framework. One feature or manifestation or type of corruption, say, illicit enrichment, is thus monitored by perception, direct measurements and

indirect ones, the former including also measures for enabling and disabling context, for legal response and for *de facto* response. A further implementation gap can be calculated between the *de jure* response and the *de facto* one. This also allows for a highly adaptable framework that can be replicated also at the sub-national level or for different sectors. When duly filled in, the matrix will provide, in one glance, a better picture of the prevalence of a specific type of corruption (through measurements), as well as an overview of the disabling and enabling circumstances.

26. The ensemble of the framework indicators, enabling and disabling factors for corruption can be measured at national and sector level, as each sector adds its own specificity and risks. However, the national context remains present in each and evert sector, as it is the national level which shapes the legal and policy formulation. Still, differences varying in importance can be found at geographical level (cities may vary substantial from countryside as to the collective action capacity of citizenry) and sector.

ANNEX 1: Statistical Framework to measure corruption

I. Components of the statistical framework to measure corruption[2]

1. CORRUPTION AREAS AS CRIMINALIZED[3] IN UNCAC						
COMPONENTS	DIRECT MEASURES	INDIRECT MEASURES				
		PERCEPTION	RISK		RESPONSE	
			OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	DE JURE (Regulation)	DE FACTO (Implementation)
1.1 Bribery[4] (UNCAC Art. 15)	**1.1.a Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public**	**1.1.d Perception of corruption in the public sector[7]** Proportion of persons who perceive that the	**1.1.e Administrative burden for citizens** Amount of time, frequency and costs met by citizens in selected public	**1.1.f E-Government[11] coverage** Proportion of persons who carried out at least one public procedure and who did so	**1.1.g Criminalization of bribery** Criminalization of bribery or related conduct in the national legislation	**1.1.h.1 Bribery investigation[12]** Rate of public officials investigated/arrested for engaging in bribery per 1,000,000

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[2] All definitions presented in the framework are for statistical purposes, they are not legal definitions.

[3] Criminalization: Is an act or determination of a ruler about certain acts which by the society or members of the society considered as acts which can be penalized as a criminal act or making an act to become a criminal act and therefore can be penalized by the government by and on behalf of the government.

[4] Bribery: the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Or the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. It can include public or foreign public officials

[7] Public Sector: Set of administrative bodies through which the State fulfills or enforces the policy and will expressed in the fundamental laws of the country. It includes all administrative bodies of the federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches and autonomous public agencies. It therefore includes the Central Sector and the Parastatal Sector, and all local levels

[11] E-government: It can be defined as the use of ICT by government agencies for the purpose of increasing and improving accessibility, effectiveness, and accountability. The principal goals of e-government should be efficient and improved service to customers, increased transparency, empowerment through access to information, efficient government purchasing and efficient administration

[12] Investigation: investigation is understood as the gathering of evidence about the detected case of corruption, including information about its extent, nature, effects, and the parties involved, to decide whether and which measures need to be taken. Investigations may be carried out internally within the organization concerned or through law enforcement agencies or other external actors, such as anti-corruption agencies, the police, or prosecutors

	officials[5] among the population Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months[6] SD: by sex of the person and the public official **1.1.b Prevalence of bribery in dealings with public officials among businesses**	public sector is corrupt[8] SD: by sex	procedures[9] directly dealt with public officials[10]	using a digital platform SD: by sex	as per Article 15 of UNCAC	SD: by sex **1.1.h.2 Bribery prosecution[13]** Rate of public officials prosecuted for engaging in bribery per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.1.h.3 Bribery sentencing[14]** Rate of public officials sentenced for engaging in bribery per 1,000,000 SD: by sex

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[5] Public official: (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person's seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a "public official" in the domestic law of a State Party

[6] International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the experience of bribery by public officials can be found at: Microsoft Word - CorruptionManual_2018-10-10_final_printing-Clean_for printshop_final_18oct2018 (unodc.org).

[8] This indicator is a better measure than the perception recorded among public officials because it overcomes the reporting bias of those who may be corrupted themselves or those who fear retaliation if they report corruption. International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the perception of bribery can be found at: Microsoft Word - CorruptionManual_2018-10-10_final_printing-Clean_for printshop_final_18oct2018 (unodc.org).

[9] One or more procedures can be selected at country level to be monitored across time (these can be for example to obtain a drive license, or a passport, or a construction permit; pay taxes, obtain public medical services, etc.)

[10] Based on the Standard Cost Model methodology https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/34227698.pdf

[13] Prosecution: to bring legal action against for redress or punishment of a crime or violation of law

[14] Sentencing: The punishment the competent authority decides should be given to someone who has been convicted of a crime

	Proportion of businesses who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months **1.1.c Frequency of bribery in dealings with public officials among the population/business** Average number of bribes paid by bribe-payer persons to public officials in the last 12 months SD: by sex of the person and the public official				**1.1.h.4 Assets recovered from bribery** Total amount of assets recovered[15] from bribery sentences

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[15] Asset recovery: the return of illicitly obtained goods and assets for the purpose of redressing the impact of corruption. For further reference on asset recovery, see the United Nations Convention against Corruption Chapter V

1.2 Trading in influence[16] (UNCAC art. 18)	1.2.a Use of personal connection to obtain public employment Percentage of successful applicants for public sector positions who Used undue advantage [17], bribery or both to secure public sector jobs	1.2.b Use of personal connection to obtain public employment Percentage of views from public officials about how frequently public officials influence the hiring of friends or relatives in the public sector	N/A	1.2.c Conflict of Interest[18] regulation Existence of a control body to monitor and enforce financial and Conflict of Interest disclosures	1.2.d Criminalization of trading in influence Criminalization of trading in influence or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 18 of UNCAC 1.2.d.1 "Cool-off" regulation Existence of gap periods[19] for public officials moving to the private sector[20]	1.2.e.1 Trading in influence investigation Rate of public officials investigated/arrested for engaging in trading in influence per 1,000,000 SD: by sex 1.2.e.2 Trading in influence prosecution Rate of public officials prosecuted for engaging in trading in influence per 1,000,000 SD: by sex

[16] Trading in influence: The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person. The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage

[17] Undue advantage: this is a form of favoritism based on friends, family and familiar acquaintances and relationships whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or a special favor to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving

[18] Conflict of interest: a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests that could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities

[19] Gap period: A limitation for hiring of a person who has been a public servant during a certain amount of time, who possesses privileged information directly acquired by reason of his employment, position or commission in the public service and allows the contracting party to benefit in the market or place himself/herself in an advantageous situation compared to his competitors

[20] Private Sector: It is composed of companies, households and institutions that are not controlled by the public sector and are operated for the benefit of private individuals

						1.2.e.3 Trading in influence sentencing Rate of public officials sentenced for engaging in trading in influence per 1,000,000 SD: by sex 1.2.e.4 Assets recovered from trading in influence Total amount of assets recovered from trading in influence sentences SD: by sex
1.3 Illicit enrichment[21] (UNCAC art. 20)	1.3.a Income declaration Proportion of public officials whose reported income differs from their disclosed assets	1.3.b Use of public office to obtain illicit gain Percentage of views from public officials about how frequently public officials use their office to obtain illicit gains or income beyond their alleged salary	N/A	1.3.c Asset/Wealth evolution regulation Existence of a control body to monitor and enforce patrimonial wealth disclosures of public officials 1.3.d Percentage of public officials who disclose their wealth out of the	1.3.e Criminalization of illicit enrichment Criminalization of illicit enrichment or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 20 of UNCAC 1.3.f Financial disclosure regime Existence of regulation on	1.3.f.1 Illicit enrichment investigation Rate of public officials investigated for engaging in illicit enrichment per 1,000,000 SD: by sex 1.3.f.2 Illicit enrichment prosecution

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[21] Statistical measure of Illicit enrichment: The significant increase in the assets of a public official with respect to his or her legitimate income that cannot be reasonably justified, nor is of legitimate origin

				total number of public officials SD: by sex	wealth disclosure for public officials	Rate of public officials prosecuted for engaging in illicit enrichment per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.3.f.3 Illicit enrichment sentencing** Rate of public officials sentenced for engaging in illicit enrichment per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.3.f.4 Assets recovered from illicit enrichment** Total amount of assets recovered from illicit enrichment sentences
1.4 Embezzlement[22], misappropriation, or diversion[23] of property or public funds (UNCAC art. 17)	N/A	N/A	**1.4.a Discretional allocation** Proportion of total government budget that can be allocated outside	**1.4.b Misused public funds** Monetary value of irregularities detected by the Supreme Audit Institution as a	**1.4.c Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds**	**1.4.d.1 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion investigation** Rate of public officials

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[22] Embezzlement: Misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position

[23] Diversion of public resources: The authorization, request, or performance of acts for the allocation or diversion of public resources, whether material, human or financial, without legal basis or contrary to the applicable rules

			the formal budget approval process	share of the total audited[24] public budget	Criminalization of embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property or public funds or related conduct in the national legislation as per Articles 17 and 22 of UNCAC	investigated for engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.4.d.2 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion prosecution** Rate of public officials prosecuted for engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.4.d.3 Embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion sentencing** Rate of public officials sentenced for engaging in embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion per 1,000,000 SD: by sex

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[24] Audit: A formal investigation of the accounts or financial situation of an organization or individual and a methodical examination and review. Audits can be internal, meaning they are performed by the organization itself; or external, meaning they are performed by an independent outside entity

						1.4.d.4 Assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion Total amount of assets recovered from embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion sentences
1.5 Abuse of functions[25] (UNCAC art. 19)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	**1.5.a Criminalization of abuse of functions** Criminalization of abuse of functions or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 19 of UNCAC	**1.5.b.1 Abuse of functions investigation** Rate of public officials investigated for engaging in abuse of functions per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.5.b.2 Abuse of functions prosecution** Rate of public officials prosecuted for engaging in abuse of functions per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.5.b.3 Abuse of functions sentencing**

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[25] Abuse of functions: the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity

						Rate of public officials sentenced for engaging in abuse of functions per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.5.b.4 Assets recovered from abuse of functions** Total amount of assets recovered from abuse of functions sentences
1.6 Obstruction of Justice[26] (UNCAC art. 25)	**1.6.a Prevalence of bribery in dealings with the judiciary**[27] **among the population** Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official from the judicial branch and who paid a bribe to a public official of the judicial branch, or were asked for a bribe by those public	N/A	N/A	N/A	**1.6.b Criminalization of obstruction of justice** Criminalization of obstruction of justice or related conduct in the national legislation as per Article 20 of UNCAC	**1.6.c.1 Obstruction of justice investigation** Rate of public officials investigated for engaging in obstruction of justice per 1,000,000 SD: by sex **1.6.c.2 Obstruction of justice prosecution**

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[26] Obstruction of justice: the use of physical force, threats or intimidation, or the promise, offering or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences established in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption

[27] Public official: (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person's seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a "public official" in the domestic law of a State Party

						Rate of public officials prosecuted for engaging in obstruction of justice per 1,000,000 SD: by sex
	officials from the judicial branch, during the previous 12 months[28]					**1.6.c.3 Obstruction of justice sentencing** Rate of public officials sentenced for engaging in obstruction of justice per 1,000,000 SD: by sex
	SD: by sex of the person and the public official					**1.6.c.4 Assets recovered from obstruction of justice** Total amount of assets recovered from obstruction of justice sentences

2. PREVENTING MEASURES						
COMPONENTS	DIRECT MEASURES	INDIRECT MEASURES				
		PERCEPTION	RISK		RESPONSE	
			OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	DE JURE (Regulation)	DE FACTO (Implementation)

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[28] International standards to use population and business surveys to measure the experience of bribery by public officials can be found at: Microsoft Word - CorruptionManual_2018-10-10_final_printing-Clean_for printshop_final_18oct2018 (unodc.org).

2.1 Merit-based public hiring (UNCAC Art 7.1a, 7.2)	2.1.a Open recruitment Proportion of public sector employees appointed without an open recruitment process in the past 12 months	N/A	2.1.b Competitive recruitment Proportion of open recruitments for public sector positions with just one candidate	2.1.c Complaint settlements Number of complaints of civil servants against the government settled on grounds of abusive dismissal	2.1.d Public service[29] regime Existence of guidelines for merit-based recruitment in the public sector	2.1.e Irregular hiring processes Number of public sector appointments reverted due to irregularities in the hiring process per 1,000 recruitments
2.2 Independence and integrity[30] of the judiciary (UNCAC Art 11:1)	**2.2.a Judicial ethics[31]** Number of public admonishments for magistrates on ethical grounds the previous year	**2.2.b.1 Perception of corruption in the judiciary** Proportion of persons who perceive that the judiciary is corrupt **2.2.b.2 Perception of corruption in law enforcement agencies** Proportion of persons who perceive that law enforcement agencies are corrupt	N/A	**2.2.c Judicial consistency** Proportion of judicial decisions from 1st instance upheld in final (3rd) one	**2.2.d Institutional reporting** Existence of annual public report on integrity problems in the judiciary	**2.2.e Ethical and integrity-related dismissal** Proportion of public officials dismissed on the grounds of ethics and integrity misdemeanors

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[29] Public service: Comprises persons employed by public authorities at central, regional, and local levels and include both civil servants and public employees

[30] Integrity: behaviors and actions consistent with a series of moral or ethical standards and principles, adopted by individuals as well as institutions, which operate as a barrier against corruption and in favor of the Rule of Law. Strict adherence to a moral code, reflected in honesty, transparency, and complete harmony in what one thinks, says and does

[31] Ethics: the attempt to understand the nature of human values, of how we ought to live and of what constitutes the right conduct

2.3 Conflict of interest (UNCAC art. 7)	2.3.a Proportion of public official who made their conflict-of-interest (COI) disclosures	N/A	N/A	2.3.b Control body to monitor and enforce COI disclosures.	**2.3.c "Cool-off" regulation** Existence of gap periods for public officials moving to the private sector	2.3.d Share of public officials sanctioned for not filling in timely, accurately or at all COI disclosures the previous year.
2.4 Management of public finances (UNCAC art. 9)	**2.4.a Share of misused public funds-** Monetary value of irregularities detected by the Supreme Audit Institutions as a share of the total audited public budget	N/A	**2.4.b Disclosure and accessibility of budgetary information.** This indicator captures the extent of budgetary information that is made available to the public, as well as its degree of accessibility. **2.4.c** Share of total government budget not subject to public disclosure due to confidentiality	N/A	**2.4.d Comprehensiveness of budget disclosure requirements.** This indicator captures the extent to which national laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines provide a basis for collecting and publishing data on public finances.	**2.4.e Sanctions against public officials for financial misconduct[32].** Number of public officials and civil servants fined, sanctioned, or imprisoned for embezzlement, misappropriation, or diversion of public funds per 1,000,000 inhabitants
2.5 Public Procurement (UNCAC art. 9)	2.5.a % of public contracts awarded without competition (without another bidder) in numbers	N/A	2.5.b % of public tenders for which information was published (open call/invitation, selection criteria, selection process,	2.5.c % procurement cases/procurement volume that were advertised online	2.5.d Compliance of public procurement regulation as per UNCAC article 9.	2.5.e Number criminal convictions[33] related to irregularities in procurement processes.

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[32] Misconduct: Contravention of the provisions of the law, which might be classified at least as: serious, non-serious

[33] Conviction: Adjudication of a criminal defendant's guilt

	and % volume total		award information, appeal process).			
2.6 Candidature for and election to public office (UNCAC art 7.2 and 7.3)	2.6.a Total campaign spending per candidate vs. total campaign funds allocated per candidate 2.6.b Total campaign spending per political party vs. total campaign funds allocated per political party 2.6.c % population who experienced vote buying during the past election	2.6.d.1 % of citizens who perceived corruption in the processes of election to public office 2.6.d.2 % of citizens who perceive corruption within political parties	2.6.e.1 Lack of an autonomous electoral body 2.6.e.2 Lack of accessibility and availability of political party funding data/information	2.6.f.1 Strength and independence of the electoral authority	2.6.g.1 Regulatory measures that sanction acts of corruption in elections 2.6.g.2 Comprehensiveness of political finance legislation: evaluation of existing prohibitions, regulations, and restrictions on financing for political campaigns	2.6.h.1 % of public officials sanctioned for failing to disclose required information on campaign public financing 2.6.h.2 # of complaints resolved / # complaints received regarding electoral offenses 2.6.h.3 Criminal proceedings initiated and terminated in relation to electoral offenses
2.7 Preventive measures for the private sector (UNCAC art. 12)	2.7.a Internal controls and auditing # of audits performed in processes vulnerable to corruption	**2.7.b Perception of corruption in the private sector** Proportion of persons who perceive that the	N/A	**2.7.c** Yearly auditing plan	**2.7.d** Private sector regulatory normative framework	**2.7.e.1** # of sanctions as a result of an auditing process where irregularities where found. **2.7.e.2** # of dismissals as a result of an

		private sector is corrupt[34]				auditing process where irregularities where found. **2.7.e.3** # of reports to law enforcement authorities as a result of an auditing process where irregularities where found.
2.8 Preventive measures for the private sector (UNCAC art. 12)	N/A	2.8.a Share of employees that perceive a corruption culture in the enterprise (via an internal survey)	N/A	2.8.b Existence of a compliance unit[35]	2.8.c Existence of a compliance policy	2.8.d Resources allocated to the compliance unit vs resources spent

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[34] Current survey tools measure perception of bribery in the private sector

[35] Compliance: Procedures, systems or departments within public agencies or companies that ensure that all legal, operational, and financial activities comply with applicable laws, rules, norms, regulations, and standards

3. ENABLING ENVIRONMENT TO REPORT AND ADDRESS CORRUPTION						
COMPONENTS	DIRECT MEASURES	INDIRECT MEASURES				
		PERCEPTION	RISK		RESPONSE	
			OPPORTUNITIES (Circumstances that enable corruption)	CONSTRAINTS (Circumstances that may deter corruption)	DE JURE (Regulation)	DE FACTO (Implementation)
3.1 International cooperation (UNCAC art.43, 44, 46, 47 & 49)	**3.1.a Extradition**[36] Proportion of extradition requests fulfilled in the last 12 months	**N/A**	N/A	N/A	**3.1.b Bilateral treaties** Number of Member States with which the Member State has signed a bilateral cooperation treaty or mechanism based on UNCAC article 43	**3.1.c Mutual legal assistance**[37] Proportion of mutual legal assistance requests fulfilled out of the total number of mutual legal assistance requests received[38] in the last 12 months
3.2 Resources allocated to fight corruption	3.2.a % of funds in the annual budget allocated to programs to fight corruption reported by the Ministry of Finance or other ministry designated	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.2.b Resource allocation to fight corruption [39]approved by the Congress/Ministry of Finance	3.2.c.1 % of funds in the annual budget executed to programs to fight corruption reported by the Ministry of Finance

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[36] Extradition: The formal process whereby a State requests from the requested State the return of a person accused or convicted of a crime to stand trial or serve a sentence in the requesting State

[37] Mutual legal assistance (MLA): in criminal matters is a process by which States seek for and provide assistance to other States in servicing of judicial document and gathering evidence for use in criminal cases

[38] The granting of mutual legal assistance depends on a series of factors, such as the criminalization of the offence in the receiving State, or that the person subject of the request has not been yet convicted or acquitted for the same offence.

[39] What programmes and institutions constitute for "fighting corruption" should be determined at country level in a way that monitoring resource allocation become feasible. A simple example of this determination could be to refer to the anti-corruption agency/institution.

	to report public spending					3.2.c.2 % of people assigned to institutions dedicated to fight corruption reported by the National relevant institution
3.3 Transparency[40] (UNCAC art. 7,9 and 10)	3.3.a.1 Number of requests to access information that were responded accurately and timely/total number of requests to access information in the last 12 months 3.3.a.2 **Prevalence of killings against journalists** Proportion of the population that was a journalist victim of intentional homicide per 1,000,000	N/A			3.3.b Availability of information online on -procurement (tenders, contracts, contracting authority). -organizational charts/income levels/ wealth evolution. -dealings and procedures (time, costs, and requirements),	3.3.c Comprehensive freedom of information (FOI) regulation, full scale, and benchmarks.
3.4 Protection of reporting persons (UNCAC art. 33)	**3.4.a Whistleblowing**[41] **reporting** Proportion of corruption-related investigations	N/A	N/A	N/A	**3.4.b Protection of reporting persons regulation** Number of mechanisms against	N/A

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[40] Transparency: an environment of openness where the access and disclosure of information is a matter of principle and human rights. Leaders, officials, and those in power operate in a visible and predictable manner that promotes trust and participation. Transparency is widely understood as a necessary precondition to prevent corruption and promote good governance and sustainability

[41] Whistleblower: Person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with the UNCAC

	opened due to whistleblowing mechanisms out of the total cases of corruption-related investigations SD: by sex of the reporting person, sex of the alleged perpetrator and type of crime/conduct				potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts who give testimony concerning corruption-related offences	